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DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT IN
THE LAW OF UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE - A CRITICAL VIEW OF
DISQUALIFICATIONS AND
DISENTITLEMENT"
By

REUBEN HASSON**

I. INTRODUCTION
Disqualifications in the law of unemployment insurance
should be abolished and the law relating to disentitlement should be
reformed. The current system of disqualification lacks rationality and
humanity; the current legal principles relating to disentitlement are
confused, arbitrary, and largely inaccessible to the many people who
rely on the unemployment insurance system to maintain a basic
standard of living.
As things stand, a disqualification may be imposed for a
maximum of six weeks as a result of an employee's dismissal because
of misconduct, an employee's refusal of suitable employment, or
because an employee quit his or her employment "without just
cause."1 A disentitlement is potentially a more serious form of

Copyright, 1987, Reuben A. Hasson.
** Reuben A. Hasson, Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School,
York University. I am
indebted to my colleagues Neil Brooks, Harry Glasbeek, Douglas Hay, Ron Lebi, Eric Tucker,
and David Vaver for reading earlier drafts of this paper and making valuable suggestions. They
are, of course, not responsible for my views.
1 See s. 43 of the Unemplojment InsuranceAC4 1971, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, as amended.
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sanction than the disqualification2 penalty as it may cover the whole
period of the employee's claim.
Because there is some overlap between disqualification and
disentitlement, the two penalties may, in some cases, be imposed
concurrently. For example, a disqualification for failure to accept
suitable employment may also be regarded as a failure to be
available for work and this will disentitle the employee.
II. DISQUALIFICATIONS
Before examining all the variants of disqualifications in detail,
it would be desirable to set out why disqualifications should be
abolished.
First, the difficulty of determining what is good cause as
opposed to a bad cause is very often an impossible task.
Second, even when everyone would agree that the employee's
case clearly has no merits - for example, the case of an employee
who assaults fellow workers without cause - there are adequate
sanctions in the law without the need to resort to disqualifications.
Third, the cost of determining whether a disqualification
should be imposed frequently exceeds the amount at stake. This is
particularly likely to be true if the claimant appeals a disqualification.
Further, an employee who has been disqualified will generally claim
welfare benefits that may be higher than the unemployment
insurance benefits the employee would have been entitled to but for
the disqualification.
3

A Misconduct

When the U.K. Unemployment Insurance Act of 1911 was
being drawn up there was a very keen debate on whether a worker
who had been guilty of misconduct should be disqualified from

2 I do not propose in this paper to deal with the labour dispute disentitlement.

That

disentitlement raises different issues from the ordinary disentitlement.

3 In this section, I have drawn heavily on David Lewis' excellent article, "Losing Benefit
Through Misconduct: Time to Stop Punishing the Unemployed?" (1985) J. Soc. Wel. L. 145.
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receiving unemployment insurance benefits.4 Beveridge argued-that
workers who were guilty of misconduct should be disqualified
because existing union rules provided for disqualification from
benefits for members who had been guilty of misconduct. This was
a strange argument:
it cannot sensibly be argued that a
disqualification is justified in a state scheme simply because
disqualifications are imposed by schemes operated by unions. It
must first be shown that the disqualifications imposed by unions are
legitimate. Also, because a union has a fraction of the resources
available to the state, the union cannot be expected to pay benefits
to ex-members.
Beveridge was opposed by Winston Churchill who insisted
that the state had no right to refuse benefits to those who paid for
them, whatever the cause of their unemployment. Churchill argued:
A disposition to over-indulge in alcohol, a hot temper, a bad manner, a capricious
employer, a new process in manufacture, a contraction in trade are all alike factors
in the risk. Our concern is with the evil, not with the causes, with the fact of
unemployment not with the character of the unemployed. In my judgment if a man
has paid to the fund for six months he should have his benefit in allcircumstances,
including dismissal for personal fault even of the gravest d1aracter, tqo securities
being the low scale of benefits and the solid rigid disqualifying period.

Although benefits are higher today and the qualifying periods
have been relaxed since Churchill's day,6 a worker in Canada today
receives only 60 percent of his or her income to a maximum of
$613.60 a week with a qualifying period ranging from ten to twenty
weeks. These conditions provide substantial safeguards against
abuse. In addition to these safeguards, there would be others in an
unemployment insurance system that functioned without
disqualifications:

4 For details of this argument, see J. Fulbrook, AdministrativeJustice and the Unemployed
(London: Mansell, 1978) at 134-38, and J. Harris, William Beveridge: A Biography (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1977) at 176. A disqualification of six weeks was imposed by s. 87 of the 1911
NationalInsuranceAct. This period has now been increased to thirteen weeks by s. 43 of the
Social Security Ac4 1986.
5 See Churchill's notes on "Malingering" quoted in B. Gilbert, The Evolution of National
Insurance in Great Britain (London: Joseph, 1966) at 272. See also Lewis, supra, note 3.
6 The 1911 BritishAct provided for a benefit of seven shillings a week in any twelve-month
period; see Fulbrook, supra, note 4.
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(i) a worker who is dismissed after committing a criminal
offence runs the risk of a criminal conviction;
(ii) a worker who is dismissed for misconduct will not get a
reference from his or her previous employer. (This denial is a
particularly severe sanction during periods of very high
unemployment.);
(iii) even if disqualifications were to be abolished, a worker
who is dismissed with cause will suffer a loss of income;
(iv) the final safeguard is the very high rate of
unemployment. Even if unemployment could be significantly
reduced, a claimant might find him or herself seeking an occupation
that has a low demand.
These penalties for being dismissed for misconduct seem to be more
than adequate sanctions to prevent workers from abusing the
unemployment insurance system.
There are two further points to be made about the system
of disqualifications for misconduct.
First, a worker who is
disqualified for misconduct does not have the right to a hearing.
This frequently has led the Unemployment Insurance Commission to
accept the employer's reason for dismissal - often without any
evidence - to impose a disqualification. Thus, in CUB 10797 the
umpire had to remind the board of referees that they could not
simply accept the employer's statement that the claimant's "oftrepeated absences" justified dismissal and the resulting
disqualification. The umpire pointed out, after an investigation of
the facts, that no offence had been committed, or that the offence
was trifling and did not justify a dismissal; this is similar to other
cases. 8 Note that in CUB 1079 the claimant was fortunate enough
to have the knowledge and resources to challenge a disqualification.
In theory, one could require that everyone who is disqualified
be entitled to a hearing and that every claimant who wishes to
appeal an adverse decision should be provided with free legal
representation. This, however, would make an expensive process

7 10 September 1954.
8 See also the decision in CUB 1044 (22 June 1954) in which the insurance officer
disqualified the claimant for a period of six weeks, even though the claimant was grieving his
dismissal before an arbitrator.
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even more expensive. It is doubtful that any government could
contemplate adopting these measures.
Second, the system of disqualifications for misconduct works
capriciously. This was argued by Katherine Kempfer over forty years
ago:9
"[s]tatutes imposing or permitting long periods of
disqualification penalize a worker who misjudges labor
10
conditions...."
Kempfer's conclusion is supported by the research of Paul
Fenn who, after studying the operation of the misconduct rule in the
United Kingdom between 1960 and 1976, concluded that
dismissals for misconduct depend not on some exogenous
standard of employee behaviour but ratheron the employer's tolerance
of such behaviour which will tend to vary with the state of trade both
seasonally and cyclically..."-'' and that "...if product demand is high
and alternative labour is scarce, it may be optimal for the employer
to accept a lower standard of conduct...." 2 On the other hand, if
product demand is low employers may wish to dismiss for relatively
trivial breaches of discipline which might not count as misconduct as
the law has defined it.
Therefore, an important determinant of whether a worker
suffers a disqualification for misconduct depends on the state of the
labour market rather than on a rule of law. This suggests that these
sanctions do not operate fairly; instead they work exclusively in
favour of employers. No one has been able to provide a satisfactory
13
justification for this arbitrary and unjust rule for seventy-five years:
it is high time to excise it from the statute book.

9 See K. Kempfer, "Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct" (1945) 55 Yale
Li. 147.

10 Ibid. at 152.
11

P. Fenn, 'The Law and Economics of the Misconduct Rule of Unemployment Insurance"
in P. Burrows & C.G. Veljanovski, eds, The EconomicApproachto Law (London: Butterworths,

1981) at 307, 317 [my emphasis].
12bid. at 314.
13 Ogus and Barendt comment that: "the exact policy considerations on which it (the
disqualification) is based have never been made entirely explicit." A. Ogus & E. Barendt, Law
of Social Security (London: Butterworths, 1978) at 109.
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B. Refusal of Suitable Employment
Sections 40 and 41 of the Unemployment Insurance Act
disqualify a claimant for refusing to apply for a position after
becoming aware that such a position is vacant or is becoming vacant,
or for failing to accept such employment when it has been offered.
Some of the decisions under this section are grotesque and
inhumane. In CUB 356714 a logger was found not to have proved
good cause when he refused employment at a lumber mill because
he had no car to travel to the mill and could not afford a chain saw.
In CUB 5323,/s a woman who refused a job as an animator in
another community on the basis that she had no car was disqualified
for six weeks. The decision in CUB 507016 held that a waitress who
refused a position at a take-out restaurant because she could not
afford transportation and babysitter costs would be disqualified. It
is impossible to see these decisions as anything more than exercises
in arbitrary cost-cutting.
The Commission usually disqualifies claimants who want fulltime employment but who turn down part-time employment. 7 In
many cases, however, a claimant who is forced to take a part-time
job will not be able to support his or herself and family.18 It would
make more sense to allow a claimant to search longer for a full-time
position. Although it is true that such claimants are using public
money to aid in their job search, the social costs could be

1427 August 1974.
1528 September 1979.
16 26 October 1978.
17

See, for example, CUB 7239 (27 January 1983). But see CUB 4907 (27 July 1978) where

a claimant was held to be justified in refusing part-time employment because of "family
responsibilities."
18 This is particularly true if the part-time job pays a low wage. There is considerable
evidence that one worker in six who works less than 30 hours a week falls into this category.
See 0. Ward, "Part Time Work Force Growing" The [Toronto] Star (3 August 1986) 1. The
article points out that "a substantial number of workers must do more than one job to earn a
basic income."
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considerably reduced if the claimants were to find full-time
employment.
Section 40(3) of the Act requires that claimants, after a
"reasonable interval," lower their sights in terms of the jobs that
they are willing to accept. The problem, however, is that claimants
do not know what constitutes a reasonable interval and by how
much their expectations must be lowered. A study prepared for the
Law Reform Commission of Canada19 found that claimants in the
first three weeks of unemployment are entitled to regard as suitable
only such jobs as are in their own occupation and which pay their
normal rate of earnings. Skilled workers with more than one year's
experience in their occupation receive an extension of one week for
every year of experience up to a maximum of thirteen weeks. At
the end of this time, claimants must expand the scope of their search
at a progressively lower rate of earnings (5 percent less per week).
It is shocking that this rule is unpublished. Even more
shocking is the fact that the Commission instructs its agents to give
evasive answers to claimants who ask about the meaning of
reasonable interval.2 ° The claimant is told simply that it depends on
the type of employment, the experience of the claimant in his or her
occupation, and the length of time on unemployment. No specific
time limit is mentioned. The fact that claimants run the risk of a
disqualification and/or disentitlement in this immoral game is nothing
short of outrageous. If such practices occurred in the field of tax
law, squads of lawyers, politicians, accountants and journalists would
be up in arms. In the area of social security, however, such
practices seem to be regarded with equanimity.2 '
This disqualification should be removed from the Act. The
prospect of saying to a claimant "either you accept this job or we
will cut off unemployment insurance benefits for six weeks" is
extremely distasteful. This smacks too much of forced labour. One's
distaste is increased by the fact that often the disqualification will be
19 p. Issalys & S. Watkins, Unemployment InsuranceBenefits (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply
and Services, 1977).

201bid. at 54-55.
21 See generally R. Hasson, 'The Cruel War - Social Security Abuse in Canada" (1981) 3

Canadian Taxation 114.
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imposed for failure to take a part-time or temporary job. Even in
the case of full-time jobs, it is undesirable to force people into jobs
for which they have no aptitude or liking. There are ample
safeguards against abuse.
C. Voluntarily Quitting Employment 22
The disqualification imposed for voluntarily quitting one's
employment excites the greatest passion. According to Ron Atkey,
former Minister for Employment, "voluntary quitters stay on
unemployment insurance claims substantially longer than others and
show the least inclination to seriously look for alternative
23
employment or training," and are thus the "biggest abusers of all."
There is no evidence that voluntary quitters stay on
unemployment insurance substantially longer than others and show
little inclination to seriously look for alternative employment or
training. Indeed, few voluntary quitters claim benefits at all.
According to Mr. Atkey, one in four voluntary quitters files a claim.
However, Mr. Basil Hargrove of the U.A.W. has maintained that24one
out of ten voluntary quitters claimed unemployment insurance.
Moreover, if one examines the causes of job quitting, it is
impossible to regard the reasons given as frivolous. A Statistics
Canada Study showed that in 197725 24,000 workers had left their
jobs because of illness or disability, 20,000 workers because of
changed residence, and 57,000 workers because of job dissatisfaction.
The purpose behind the disqualification of voluntary quitters
is to ensure that people in low paying jobs remain there. Some fear
that already too many workers abandon low paying jobs. Thus, the

22 In this section of my paper, I have drawn substantially on a portion of my earlier paper,
"The Cruel War," ibid. at 122-23.

23 R. Atkey, "Axworthy Soft on Job Quitters, Atkey Maintains" The [Toronto] Star (14 July
1980) A2. See also R. Atkey, "CLC Opposes Job Quitter Proposals" The [Toronto] Star (19
July 1980) A7.
24 B. Hargrove, "Atkey Ignores Facts on Job Quitters, Says UAW Spokesman" The

[Toronto] Globe and Mail (18 July 1980) 7.
25

Statistics Canada, StatisticalReport on the Operation of the Unemployment InsuranceAct

(1976-77) (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1977) at 19-21.
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Canadian Manufacturers Association, in its brief to the Forget
Commission on Unemployment Insurance recommended that a
longer disqualification
period should be imposed for those individuals
26
who quit their jobs.
This disqualification is enforced with the greatest severity
because it causes the most anxiety among politicians and
administrators. The decisions on voluntary quitting lend support to
Schwartsman's claim that in the Commission's Toronto office "U.L
staff work under orders to impose virtually automatic penalties on
claimants who quit their jobs whether they deserve a penalty or
27
not.
It is virtually impossible to prove that a claimant quit with
just cause. Consider, for example, CUB 316328 and CUB 338329
where the umpires held that quitting due to a seriously strained
working relationship is not quitting with just cause, even if
termination was prudent and necessary in the circumstances. This
is indeed Hobson's choice! If the employee does the sensible thing
and quits, he or she will be disqualified for six weeks for a voluntary
quitting. If, however, the employee stays and the relationship
deteriorates further, he or she stands an excellent chance of being
dismissed and disqualified for misconduct. Similarly, claimants who
are underpaid, having regard to their professional qualifications and
experience, will incur a penalty for leaving their job.30 Again,
claimants who are placed in a job that entails the use of heavy
machinery and who leave because they are afraid of the machinery
will incur a disqualification3 l As a final example, workers who take

26

Canadian Manufacturers' Association, Submission on Unemployment InsuranceReview (13
December 1985) at 8, recommendation (e) suggests that voluntary quitters should be
disqualified for twelve weeks.
27 V. Schwartsman, "Atkey Missed How Job-Abuse Data Decided, Former UI Man Says"

The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (24 July 1980) 7.
28 6 July 1972.
29 20 September 1973.
30 See CUB 3247 (22 January 1973).
31 See CUB 2538 (30 September 1965).
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early retirement, even if encouraged to do so by their 32employers, will
be held to have quit voluntarily without good cause.
In those very rare cases where a disqualification for a
voluntary quitting is removed, it frequently requires two appeals to
set aside disqualification. Thus, it is common for the Commission to
disqualify a claimant who has quit a job to join his or her spouse
who has found employment in another city or province. For
example, in CUB 329833 a disqualification that was imposed in these
circumstances was set aside by the umpire on appeal. In the course
of his judgment, however, the umpire reaffirmed the principle "that
domestic circumstances do not normally constitute 'just cause' within
the meaning of the Act for voluntarily leaving employment. 34
The limited scope of the umpire's decision in this case is
demonstrated by two lines of cases. First, in CUB 557835 an umpire
held that a spouse was disqualified from receiving benefits because
she did not join her partner until after an interval of time. This
decision displays a shocking lack of common sense. For example,
one spouse may be offered employment in a different city beginning
on a particular date, while.the other spouse may be contractually
bound to his or her employment until some time after that date. It
would be foolish for the spouse who is offered an attractive job not
to take it. Theoretically, the spouse who has a contract until a later
date could break his or her contract, but this might jeopardize any
chance of employment in the city they were moving to because he
or she would almost certainly not get a letter of reference. In
addition, many decent people feel obliged to honour their contracts,
particularly if this is going to cause disruption to an employer, fellow
employees, and clients.
Second, disqualifications have generally been imposed on a
common-law partner who voluntarily terminated employment to

32 See, for example, CUB 3332 (25 June 1973); see also the decision of the English Court
of Appeal in Crewe & Another v. Anderson, [1972] 1 W.L.R 1209.
33 25 April 1973.

35 29 May 1979.
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follow his or her partner fl 6 At a time when common-law
relationships are recognized throughout the field of social security
and even in the area of private law,3 7 it is impossible to justify why
If the
unemployment insurance should have its own rules.
disqualification for voluntary quitting were to be abolished, there
would be sufficient safeguards against abuse: one who quit a job
would, even without disqualification, suffer a loss in income; would
jeopardize pension and social security rights; would not get a letter
of reference; and, may experience great difficulty in finding a
suitable job.
It is sometimes argued that it is inconsistent with insurance
principles to give unemployment insurance to someone who has quit
a job. There are two responses to this. First, if one applied private
insurance principles to a case of voluntary quitting (or any other
disqualification), the result would not be a disqualification but a
complete denial of benefits. This is because there is no analogue in
private insurance to a disqualification. Again, and more important,
the people who rely on insurance principles are not using insurance
in its private law context; rather, they are using insurance as a
metaphor. Unemployment insurance is simply a way of stating that
an employee is assured of benefits after loss of his or her
employment.
III. DISENTITLEMENT38
A worker who is unavailable for work will be disentitled from
Neither the
claiming unemployment insurance benefits.
Unemployment InsuranceAct nor the umpires have defined
36 See CUB 4652 (2 September 1977), CUB 6334 (10 April 1981). An exception to this
principle is made if the couple have children.

37 See, for example, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Pettkus v. Becker
(1980), [1980] 2 S.C.R1

834, 117 D.L.RL (3d) 257 and Sorochan v. Sorochan (1986), [1986] 2

S.C.Rt 38, 29 D.LIR (4th) 1.
38 The principal sections dealing with disentitlement are ss. 25 and 36 of the Act. Section
25 provides that a claimant is not entitled to be paid initial benefit for any working day in a
benefit period of which he fails to prove that he was capable and available for work and unable
to find suitable employment on that day. Section 36 provides that "a claimant is not entitled
to be paid extended benefit for any working day for which he fails to prove that he was capable
of and available for work and unable to find suitable employment."
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unavailability for work. Those definitions that have been given by
the Commission are excessively broad. Claimants may show their
unavailability for work by not being prepared to work for a
"reasonable" wage. This is despite the fact that when they ask what
a reasonable wage would be, they are given no guidance and are left
to guess. 9
A fraudulent twist will sometimes be added to this procedure.
In its November 1973 report, 40 the Unemployment Insurance
Advisory Committee stated that, in certain circumstances, the Benefit
Control Officers made use of leading questions and subsequently
twisted the meaning of replies by making them much more
categorical than they had actually been. The most frequent shifts in
meaning seem to have occurred with regard to the salary desired by
the claimant. On the basis of observations made by members of
Boards of Referees, the Advisory Committee therefore disapproved
of Benefit Control Officers asking: "I suppose a minimum wage of
$3.25 an hour would suit you?" and after getting the reply: "Yes,
I would like to get that," noting in their report that the claimant
demanded a minimum wage of $3.25 an hour.41 This sleight of hand
can produce an immediate disentitlement. Unfortunately, the
Advisory Committee did not recommend that Benefit Control
Officers who engaged in such practices be fired.
Failure to get the correct answer on how far one is prepared
to travel to and from work can also result in disentitlement.
Similarly, the failure to have a babysitter can result in disentitlement.
Incredibly, even jury service can result in a claimant being
disentitled. The Forget Commission has recommended that this
practice be changed.4 2
As a final example of disentitlement, a claimant will be
disentitled if he or she moves from an area of low unemployment to
an area of high unemployment. This is illustrated by the decision in
39 See text accompanying notes 19-21.
40 See Issalys & Watkins, supra, note 19 at 88.
41
42

Ibid.

Canada, Report of the Commission ofinquiry on Unemployment Insurance(Ottawa: Supply
and Services, 1986) at 321.
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CUB 3262.43 In that case a twenty-year-old Newfoundlander moved
to Toronto where he was employed as a labourer from September
1, 1971, until March 24, 1972, when he lost his employment as a
At that point he returned to
result of his misconduct.
Newfoundland "to a sparsely populated area where there are no
known employers of any consequence." The claimant registered for
work but no employment was offered to him. The umpire
disentitled the claimant quoting from the decision in CUB 132744
As it has often been pointed out by the umpire, unemployment insurance is
essentially designed to cover cases of involuntary and short-term unemployment and

not cases who deliberately leave their employment in large centres and move to
isolated and sparsely populated areas, thereby exposing themselves to lengthy periods
of unemployment.

The view that residing in a large centre means that the
claimant will only have to endure a short period of unemployment
is false. Additionally, it is undesirable to force a claimant to remain
in a large centre even if this means the claimant is lonely and
miserable in unfamiliar surroundings. Allowing such a claimant to
return home may not only be more humane but also, in the long
run, cheaper for the state.
A worker who is committing fraud45 on the unemployment
insurance scheme should be deemed to be unavailable for work.
Some examples of the kind of behaviour that should disentitle a
worker are going on a holiday in a different province or country
while continuing to collect unemployment cheques, starting a
personal business while continuing to collect unemployment
insurance, collecting both unemployment insurance and welfare, and
refusing to speak to Canada Manpower about possible job
opportunities.
These abuses do not occur frequently,46 but they have
occurred, and obviously claimants in these situations should be
-

43 10 March 1973.

44 24 January 1957.
45 1 am usingfraud here in the popular as opposed to its legal meaning.
46 Not one enquiry, whether official or unofficial, has stated that fraud is a serious problem
in the unemployment insurance system.

1987]

Unemployment Insurance

629

denied unemployment insurance. The concept of unavailability
should not be extended beyond this point because this would involve
disentitling people for the same arbitrary reasons for which we are
presently denying them benefits.
A The Impact of Disqualificationsand Disentitlements
The number of disqualifications and disentitlements imposed
between the years 1979 and 1983 is alarmingly high (see Table 1).
In each one of these years, more than half a million claimants were
either disqualified or disentitled. The percentage of those claimants
disqualified or disentitled ranged from 21.5 percent in 1982 to 39.1
percent in 1979. This meant that in the five-year period the lowest
disqualification disentitlement rate was one in five workers whereas
the highest disqualification disentitlement cut-off rate was two in five
workers. Over the five-year period, the average number of disentitlements and disqualifications came to 29.6 percent. This is close
to a disqualification disentitlement rate of one worker for every
three claimants.
It is submitted that these figures are intolerably high in the
light of the fact that there are already abundant safeguards against
abuse. The administration of the law is lacking in both common
sense and humanity. This situation constitutes a national disgrace.
B. The Road to Reform
It is not enough to suggest that disqualifications should be
abolished and disentitlements should be redefined. It is crucial to
see the administration of disentitlements and disqualifications as a
response to prevailing rates of high unemployment.
High
unemployment generates excessive social costs; the harsh
administration of disqualifications and disentitlements represents an
attempt to control those costs.
I propose to show how the administration of unemployment
insurance has become harsher as unemployment has increased. If
the cause of our harsh administration of unemployment insurance is
excessive unemployment, then the cure for the problem lies in
moving toward full employment.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
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In 1971 dramatic changes were made to the unemployment
insurance scheme.47 First, coverage was made virtually universal,
being extended from approximately 80 percent of the work force to
96 percent. Second, for those without a previous claim, it was
provided that they could get unemployment insurance if they had
eight insurable weeks in the last fifty-two. For those with a previous
claim, eight insurable weeks were needed from the beginning of the
benefit week. This contrasts with the 1955 requirement of thirty
insurable weeks in the last two years. Third, benefits were increased
from an average of 43 percent of earnings to 66.6 percent of
earnings. A dependent's rate of 75 percent was paid to all in
extended benefit phases and to low-income earners. Finally,
sickness, maternity, and retirement benefits were payable to claimants
with twenty weeks of insurable employment in the qualifying period.
It is clear that from the inception of these reforms the
government had exaggerated fears of fraud. Governments in Canada
(and elsewhere) have, after expanding the coverage of a scheme,
been very sensitive to allegations of abuse. It must be remembered
that opposition to these changes came not only from extreme
conservatives. The [Toronto] Globe & Mail, for example, called the
reforms "immoral and stupid."48 Moreover, throughout the 1970s
there were numerous commissions (official and unofficial) to look for
abuse.49 To detect fraud the government drew on the ranks of
former policemen, private detectives, and collection agency
investigators, who comprised a large number of the benefit control
officers it employed. The authors of the Law Reform Commission
study on the administration of unemployment insurance pointed out,
however, that "... these hiring practices may create a risk that benefit

47 1 am deeply indebted to the summary provided by LA. Pal, "Revision and Retreat:

Canadian Unemployment Insurance 1971-1981" in J.S. Ismael, ed., CanadianSocial Welfare

Policy: FederalandProvincialDimensions (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985)
75 at 81-83.

48 J. Saywell, ed., CanadianAnnual Review of Politics and Public Affairs 1971 (Toronto:

University of Toronto Press, 1972) at 358, quoted in Pal, ibid. at 84.
49 See, for example, The Report of the Task Force on Employment Opportunitiesfor Welfare
Recipients (Toronto: The Swadron Report, 1972); C.L. Barber, Welfare Policy in Manitoba
(Winnipeg. University of Manitoba, 1972); CanadianCouncil on Social Development Men on
Relief (Ottawa, 1972).
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control operations be occasionally tainted with the ethics and the
50
(sometimes strongly criticized) methods of private agencies.
The second step in the fight in the mid-1970s against abusers
of the system was the interviewing of groups of workers who were
thought to be prone to work shyness5 The fact that there was no
evidence that these claimants were prone to malingering made no
difference. Additionally, workers who had been fired for misconduct
or had voluntarily quit their jobs were summoned for regular
interviews. 52
The Commission sponsored a survey in 1977 which found
that "71 percent of Canadians felt that the Unemployment Insurance
programme should be tightened up."5 3 Although claimants were not
asked for their view of the system, they would have described a
Kafkaesque regime under which they had to guess what was "suitable
employment" without any guidance from a Commission that was all
too often arbitrary and inefficient. At the same time these surveys
were being commissioned, the government was spending more than
a million dollars a year telling Canadians that abuse of the
unemployment insurance system was a serious problem.5 4 Those
monies would have been better spent informing citizens of the
benefits to which they were entitled under the Act. The case law
reveals that there were many claimants who did not know of the
55
new benefits.

50 See Issalys & Watkins, supra, note 19 at 75.
51 For details of this scheme, see Schwartsman, "How Dark Is it in the Bowels of the
Beast?" (May-June 1981) This Magazine 4 at 6.
52 See Potter, "Unemployment Insurance: Policies and Principles of Disqualification and

Disentitlement for Benefits" (1976-77) 3 Dal. L..178 at 184.
53 Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, quoted in E. Rosen,A Report on the
Comprehensive Review of the Unemployment InsuranceProgram in Canada (Ottawa: Advisory
Council on the Status of Women, 1977) at 5.
54 See the statement by the Hon. Bud Cullen, then Minister of Employment and

Immigration in Canada, House of Commons Debates (23 January 1978) 2301.
55

Generally, ante-dated benefits are denied to claimants who do not claim them because
they did not know of their existence, but see CUB 3294 (25 April 1973) where the claimant, a
West Indian, was given ante-dated benefits because she was new to Canada and came from the
West Indies "where unemployment benefit does not exist."
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As a further step against fraud, the government began to
prosecute claimants more aggressively under sections 47 and 121 of
the Act for wrongfully making claims or for making false statements.
Section 47 imposes administrative penalties; section 121 imposes
criminal penalties. A section 47 penalty was imposed by the
Commission when there were felt to be "mitigating or extenuating
circumstances," whereas a section 121 penalty was imposed
when it
56
circumstances.
mitigating
no
were
there
that
felt
was
The increase in the number of administrative penalties and
prosecutions under the Act between 1974 and 1978 is shown below.
Table 2
Administrative Penalties and
Prosecutions under the
Unemployment Insurance Act*
Act
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

No. of
Claims
1,974,000
2,438,000
2,429,000
2,500,000
2,809,000

No. of s. 47
Penalties
22,474
26,853
38,151
60,000
50,000

No. of s. 121
Penalties
924
1,800
4,600
6,500
6,700

*Source: Unemployment Insurance Commission, Annual Reports
1974-79 (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1979).
The percentage of claimants subject to either penalty or
prosecution rose from 1.19 percent of claims in 1974 to 2.66 percent
in 1977. In 1978 this figure dropped to 2.01 percent but it is clear
that a deliberate attempt was made to exercise stricter control over
57
claimants
In short, since 1971 the government has waged an
increasingly aggressive campaign against fraud. This campaign has
56 For a list of mitigating circumstances see Issalys & Watkins, supra, note 19 at 114-16.
57

The reports of the Unemployment Insurance Commission do not publish figures for
these penalties after 1979.
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been very harmful. Not only have claimants often been regarded as
potential criminals, but the public has been misled, both as regards
the generosity of unemployment insurance and the extent of its
abuse. In fact, unemployment benefits are not generous, and the
administration of the system is extremely arbitrary.
C. The Retreat from Full Employment
Canada's unemployment rate did not exceed 5.5 percent
during the 1960s, except from 1960 to 1962 (see Table 3). In the
1970s it never fell below that figure. In the 1980s, unemployment
in excess of 10 percent seems to have become the norm.
The government's response to the rising unemployment rate
has been to introduce a series of cut-backs in unemployment
benefits. The cut-backs seem to track very closely the increase in
unemployment rates. The first measure came in 19751 when the
government eliminated the 75 percent rate in favour of 66.6 percent
and the maximum disqualification period was increased from three
weeks to six weeks.
A second measure was introduced in 1976 and passed in
1977: the variable entrance requirements were increased from ten
to fourteen weeks. Further, the Unemployment Insurance Account
was to be used for work-sharing and job creation expenditures. A
third measure in 1978 changed the minimum insurability to an hours
basis rather than an income basis - thus reducing claims from people
working few hours but at high rates. Higher entrance rates (twenty
weeks) were introduced for repeaters, new entrants, and re-entrants.
Benefit rates were cut from 66.6 percent to 60 percent. A portion
of extended benefit costs would now be borne by employer and
employee contributions. Finally, there was a provision whereby highincome earners would pay back a portion of unemployment
insurance benefits received in the previous year.
One reason the government gave for the cut-backs in
unemployment insurance was the improvements in other social
service benefits. Thus, Robert Andras argued that the 1973 increase
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58
in family allowances made the 75 percent benefit rate unnecessary.

Table 3
Unemployment Rates in Canada
1961-1985*
1961
7.2
1962
5.9
1963
5.5
1964
4.7
1965
3.9
1966
3.6
1967
4.1
1968
4.8
1969
4.7
1970
5.9
1971
6.4
1972
6.3
1973
5.6
1974
5.4
1975
7.0
1976
7.2
1977
8.2
1978
8.5
1979
7.6
1980
7.1
1981
8.5
1982
12.7
1983
11.1
1984
10.7
1985
10.1
*Source: The Labour Force (Statistics Canada, 1961-1985).

58 kid. at 81.
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However, this increase in social benefits never took place. The
1975, 1977, and 1978 cuts that took place were, as Leslie Pal points
59
out' "...made within the context of general expenditure reductions."
were motivated by a visceral
According to Pal, "[p]rogram changes ...

sense that Unemployment Insurance expenditures were too high."60
It is true that no new legislation was introduced between
1979 and 1984, but the administration of the Act was made much
more severe. It is instructive to compare the disqualification and
disentitlement rates between 1972 and 1976 and between 1979 and
1983:
Table 4 61,62
Year

Disqualifications and
Disentitlements as a
Percentage
of Claims

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

9.1
12.2
14.5
12.4

59

1kid. at 89.

60

Ibid.

61

Ibid. at 85, Table 2.

62

See post, Table I.

14.562

39.1
36.9
33.0
21.5
24.663
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The next set of cut-backs was introduced in 1985 and 1986.
In 1985 severance pay became a criterion to be taken into account
in determining a claimant's right to unemployment benefits. In 1986
retirement benefits received by early retirees also joined the list of
considerations.
Despite all the talk about natural rates of unemployment, it
seems that we cannot afford the cost of this beast. Or, to put it
another way, we can only live with a natural rate of unemployment
by emasculating our social security system. The most recent
proposals for reform have been to cut benefits to 50 percent and
their duration to sixteen weeks 63 and to annualizethe unemployment
insurance system and to eliminate regionally extended benefit
periods.64 If implemented these would leave us with a shell of an
unemployment insurance system.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are two priorities in redesigning our unemployment
insurance scheme. First, the administration of unemployment
insurance has to be taken out of the hands of specialists in the
detection of fraud. 6s Second, there must be a commitment to
achieving full employment. However, full employment is not to be
achieved by the massive tax handouts that are currently used to

63 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada
(Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1984), (Commissioner The Hon. Donald S. MacDonald). The

Commission recommended inter alia: (1) reducing the benefit from 60 percent to 50 percent;
(2) raising the entrance requirement to fifteen to twenty weeks from ten to fourteen; (3) the
elimination of extended benefit periods in areas of high unemployment; (4) to reduce the
maximum period of benefits to sixteen weeks; see vol. 2 at 116. For a brief critique of these
proposals see J.P. Grayson, "The Ignored Costs of the MacDonald Commission" (Spring 1985)
3 Atk. Rev. of Can. Stud. 29.

64The Forget Commission proposes: (1) the adoption of the concept of annualization of
benefits and (2) the abolition of regionally extended benefits. The adoption of these measures
would reduce benefits from 1985 levels by 50 percent in Prince Edward Island, 49 percent in

New Brunswick, 47 percent in Newfoundland, 35 percent in Nova Scotia, 36 percent in Quebec,
34 percent in British Columbia, 29 percent in Saskatchewan, 24 percent in Manitoba, 17 percent
in Alberta and 16 percent in Ontario. See Ministry report, supra, note 42 at 457.

65 See text accompanying note 50.
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encourage business to develop industries. 6 Business must practise
the self-reliance that it so readily proclaims others should practise.
Next, there must be a reorganization of priorities. More
insurance agents or more people employed in advertising are not
needed. Rather, our needs are in the public sector; more people
are needed to inspect factories 67 and to construct low- and middleincome housing.
There must also be a redefinition of full employment. There
is a need to phase out overtime in order to provide a thirty-five
hour week to allow workers more recreation.68
Finally, and perhaps most important, there must be a
considerable increase in the benefits of welfare recipients, of
unemployment insurance benefits and the low paid workers. One of
the causes for the increase in unemployment in the 1970s and 1980s
is the fact that millions of low paid people have seen their standard
of living drop. For many welfare recipients the task of providing
adequate food has become an impossibility. In many centres, food
banks now seek to provide that aid. People in this situation cannot
think of buying clothes or beds, let alone more expensive items. For
these groups, the payment of rent, food, and fuel costs will absorb
nearly all their resources. There will be precious little left to buy
anything else.

66 See, for example, N. Brooks, "Tax Expenditures" (1987) 26 Osgoode Hall LJ.

67 See E. Tucker, "The Persistence of Market Regulation of Occupational Health and
Safety: The Stillbirth of Voluntarism" in Essays in LabourRelations (Don Mills, Ont.: CCH

Canadian Ltd, 1984) at 219. Professor Tucker writes: 'The Ministry (of Labour) makes no
secret of its enforcement philosophy. It sees primary responsibility for health and safety resting
with employers and workers acting co-operatively through the internal responsibility system.
The primary role of inspectors is to facilitate the functioning of the internal responsibility
system, not to directly enforce the regulations themselves"; ibiL at 238-39. Tucker effectively
demonstrates the failure of this revival of laissez-faire. In this connection, note the complaints
by trade unionists in Manitoba to the effect that whereas there are 250 officers employed to

enforce fish and game laws, there are only thirty-six factory and mine inspectors; "Manitoba
Fish Safer Than Workers" see The [Toronto] Star (10 August 1986) A15.

68 For a recent discussion of proposals to shorten the working week, see F. Reid, "More
Jobs Through Shorter Hours" (June 1986) 12 Can. Pub. Pol. 275.
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Once we move in the direction of full employment, 69 it will
be possible to get rid of disqualifications and to limit disentitlement
to a few egregious cases. It will also be possible to use the savings
through having to pay less in unemployment insurance and to spend
more on developing proper training schemes.
To some, my proposals may seen unrealistic, even visionary.
However, the implementation of these proposed measures is
necessary if we are to prevent further disintegration of the welfare
state - a disintegration that would have disastrous consequences for
many.

69 Obviously, I can do no more than sketch my plans for a society with full employment.
There is a full discussion of the measures needed in R. Bellan, UnnecessaryEvil. An Answer
to Canada's High Unemployment (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986).

